Carlos Santana and the new leadoff prototype at the Corner of Carnegie and Ontario

There’s Carlos Santana frustration brewing at the Corner of Carnegie and Ontario, and it’s really starting to get old. This isn’t anything new, as Santana has been the most misunderstood baseball player on the North Coast since the day he was called up to Progressive Field in 2010. This goes far beyond the fact that he’s always the second “Carlos Santana” that shows up on any internet search. Santana isn’t your traditional “power hitter,” as many labeled him immediately after the 2008 trade that brought him to Cleveland. He isn’t your traditional .300 hitter, even though the minor league version of Santana hit .290. It just goes to show you that perception is often the rule, even if it isn’t true.

Instead, Santana has masked his offensive brilliance in a package that makes him hard to define past this: he’s one of the Top 30 hitters in all of baseball. Even Indians’ manager Terry Francona has sometimes struggled with finding a place in the line-up for Carlos. Consider this: while his predominant spot in the line-up has been as the clean-up hitter, he only had 38 PAs there since the start of 2016. Overall, since Francona joined the club as manager prior to the 2013 season, Santana has, dependent on year, spent the majority of time hitting fourth and fifth, with a dalliance at the six-spot… until last year. That’s when Francona, almost begrudgingly, allowed Santana to hit first, but only against righties.

Santana responded with an elite 17% walk rate, a .385 OBP, a .381 wOBA and a 140 wRC+. While some may think this overvalues the walk, remember, the No. 1 priority for the leadoff hitter is to get on base and score runs. Santana scored 57 runs batting first in only 86 games. So check and check.

While Santana split time with Rajai Davis as the lead-off hitter in 2016, many in statistical circles were wondering why Santana didn’t get full-time at bats there. Davis, he of World Series home run heroics, wasn’t a great lead-off hitter, minus his plus speed. While Santana’s power dips from the right side of the plate, he’s still elite in every other category that’s important to a leadoff hitter. His career walk rate is slightly worse as a right-handed hitter (14.6% L versus 15.9% R), but almost all the other important intangibles as a lead-off hitter improve. His career OBP as a right-handed hitter is .383, versus .356 as a lefty. His slugging is nearly identical (.441 as a righty, versus .446 as a lefty). His career wOBA is (.361 as a righty, versus .350 as a lefty), and his career wRC+ is (130 as a righty, versus 122 as a lefty). Minus the home run power, Santana’s numbers as a right-handed hitter better suit leading off.

What’s most impressive about Santana is how he altered his approach hitting from the left side to better suit leading off. All of his numbers improved in the important lead-off categories, as opposed to his career numbers. And to the traditionalists out there, Santana belted 34 total homers, satisfying that mystical shelf that so many “old-school statisticians” have been craving. While Santana’s overall walk rate dropped to a career low of 14.4% (still pretty damn good), his strikeout rate also dropped to a career low 14.4%. Like many Indians in the line-up, his offensive IQ is outstanding. Santana finds a way to mold into every opportunity placed in front of him, regardless of comfort level.

But even with the loss of Rajai Davis, and with the wildly successful 2016 for Santana as the unconventional lead-off hitter, that national media has taken an interesting approach to the 2017 versions of the unconventional lead-off hitters.

Big surprise, right?

*****

I suppose we have to take a look at the conventional lead-off hitter, before we get to Carlos Santana in 2017. In Cleveland, the prototypical lead-off hitter roamed centerfield for the Indians throughout much of the 1990’s with the speed and grace of a player that was built to be there. Kenny Lofton was exactly what the doctor prescribed, and what every baseball bible predicated.

Lofton was fast, and in the era prior to, well, today, that’s really all you needed. Hell, that’s why Rajai Davis was leading off so much in 2016. But Lofton was more than fast. His career OBP was .372, and in his prime with the Indians, he had three seasons in which it was over .400.1 He hit for average2, and scored a ton of runs. The fact that he played center and was fantastic defensively only helped finish off the stereotypical picture.

Lofton was the dream, and while the Hall of Fame-voting-idiots bounced him out of the voting after one year, you could legitimately make a case that Lofton was a Top 5 lead-off hitter of all time.

But players like Lofton are unicorns. Too often, while speed is enticing, it doesn’t often get to first base to allow it to be effective. When you combine that with metrics, there are other, interesting avenues to consider when pondering hitting first.

You also have to understand that hitting leadoff isn’t always about hitting leadoff. Percentages increase throughout a season regarding how many times in an inning that you hit first. Consider this: of Santana’s 688 plate appearances in 2017, only 228 led off an inning, and 85 of those were the first inning. Francisco Lindor had 106 leadoff innings, Jason Kipnis had 118, and Jose Ramirez had 143. Sure, Santana was afforded more opportunity, but there are other things to consider.

Santana would get more first inning opportunities with the full-time leadoff gig, but what’s especially interesting is how often he’ll actually be able to drive runners in from the bottom of the order. With one of the deepest lineups in baseball, Santana reverts back to his “clean-up” self after that first at-bat.

You see, it’s that out of the box thinking that can alter the Indians’ 2017 fortunes, but could even change the landscape of baseball. So, Santana provided this shift in thinking, right?

******

In case you haven’t heard, Kyle Schwarber is Major League Baseball’s new prototype for a leadoff hitter. The World Series media darling, and Joe Buck’s man-crush, has gotten the nod in Chicago at the top of the order. Since then, every quirky outlet, from Ringer, to ESPN, to CBS Sports have jumped on the “Joe Maddon-is-brilliant” bandwagon, for thinking so outside the box.3

This experiment has been tried a variety of times over the years, but Maddon is given credit for creating the 2017 leadoff model.

Except he didn’t create it. He watched it.

****

Santana wasn’t a major factor as a lead-off hitter in the World Series, but his overall .380 OBP, and Maddon’s Santana fascination likely was a motivator for the Schwarber move this year. The Cubs roster is loaded, and while a guy like Ben Zobrist might be a good fit there (Maddon has used him in the lead-off role in previous seasons with the Rays, and the Cubs) as well, Schwarber does get on base a lot.

But he’s no Santana.

Santana’s walk rate has historically been 15% or better, and while he does strike out, it’s not at Schwarber’s near 30% in his rookie season.4 Sure, Schwarber possesses perhaps more home run power, but Santana is just a smarter hitter. As I mentioned already, his offensive IQ is substantial, and his extra base power is unquestioned. When you combine it with a career .365 OBP, you have something pretty special.

In Cleveland, Terry Francona was ahead of the curve, whether he wanted to be or not.

*****

Carlos Santana can’t buy a break. In Cleveland, he’s been somewhat of a media-pariah throughout the duration of his career. The Indians stole him in a trade for Casey Blake in 2009, which was a heralded move at the time, but since then, he’s had to overcome some odd stereotypes at every step of the way.

1. He wasn’t Victor Martinez behind the plate, even though his offensive numbers were every bit as good.
2. Yan Gomes supplanted him at catcher, so Santana volunteered to try playing third base, because he wanted to play in the field badly. Instead of being heralded as a team player, he was criticized for “having to play at a primary position.”
3. He’s played hurt, because he figured playing was more beneficial to the team, rather than sitting. He was then somewhat chastised by manager Terry Francona, who said, “I don’t quite know how to respond to that (Santana playing hurt). I think he’s had some back tightness for sure. He just didn’t want me to tell anybody. I guess he took care of that.”
4. There have been rumblings that Santana doesn’t want to DH, that he’d rather play in the field. This stems a bit from his run at third base, but also coexists with his desire to play first base. While other players are heralded as gamers, it’s been insinuated by various sources that he can be a malcontent. This has also tied together with his leading off. While some comments have come from Santana about “having to learn how to hit first,” much of it is simply an ‘I’ll do whatever it takes’ mentality.

But enter Santana in 2017. Joining the Indians’ line-up is good friend Edwin Encarnacion, who will lock up the clean-up spot for the duration of the year. Re-joining the line-up is arguably the Indians best overall hitter in Michael Brantley, who missed the entire 2016 season.

With Rajai Davis gone, the line-up depth locked Santana in as the full-time, 2017 leadoff hitter. Santana currently leads the league with three doubles, and also has a home run. He’s scored five runs in six games, and hasn’t yet kicked into full gear regarding walks (super-small sample size alert… 10.3% BB rate). But still, Santana feels like a game-changer at the position, even if the rest of the mainstream media is focusing on the darling Chicago Cubs, and Kyle Schwarber.

How many games will the Indians start off with the lead, if Santana hits 30-plus homers?5 How many games will a runner start off in scoring position, without Santana having to steal a base?6 And what if he does pick up his stolen base game?7

With Francisco Lindor, Jose Ramirez, Michael Brantley, Edwin Encarnacion and Jason Kipnis having chances to drive him home, it could revolutionize the game. Yet hitters like Santana are every bit as unicorn as the Kenny Loftons of this world, so perhaps Santana is less a prototype, and more a singular force of nature. And with Jason Kipnis returning soon from rehab, and with Austin Jackson playing solid early on, Francona could begin to get itchy to go traditional again.

Kipnis has hit lead-off before, and so has Brantley. JRam’s OBP was up as well, and Lindor may be the future lead-off hitter, since he has more of those “traditional” skills that people love so much.

But Santana’s career has been a study in perseverance, and breaking traditional stereotypes is something that he’s become accustomed to, even if Kyle Schwarber gets all the credit.

1. Four times, if you include his lost season with the Atlanta Braves [↩]
2. over .300 during five of his Indians’ seasons, and .300 for his career with the Indians [↩]
3. Joe Maddon is brilliant in many ways, and he did try John Jaso there a few years back, followed by Matt Joyce. But in the end, he continued to utilize speed guys, such as Demond Jennings and B.J. Upton. [↩]
4. It’s 40% this year, in a super small sample size [↩]
5. Well, somewhere in the realm of 30, duh [↩]
6. Santana had 68 extra base hits, for what it’s worth [↩]
7. While not speedy, Santana is one of the smartest baserunners in the game. [↩]

Read More

Why Carlos Santana Shouldn’t Hit Leadoff

Indians Manager Terry Francona made some waves recently when he suggested he was considering the possibility of using Carlos Santana to bat lead-off in the team’s lineup. Admittedly, Francona knows a lot more about baseball than I do and probably has what he feels are good reasons for such a consideration, however, I think this is a bad idea.
Santana spent most of the 2015 season as the cleanup hitter mostly by default because there weren’t any other candidates who could have done better. With that said, I thought he would have been served better elsewhere in the lineup. Ideally, I think he’s a better fit in the fifth or sixth spot in the lineup or perhaps even as low as seventh.
Yes, Santana does get on base and had 113 walks to lead the league in 2014 and had 108 walks in 2015 with a .357 OBP in 666 plate appearances in 154 games last year. Those certainly look like good numbers.
Keep in mind, as a former catcher Santana isn’t a fast runner, perhaps considered to be pretty slow when compared to the average player. He did have 11 steals in 2015, but to me that’s really an inconsequential statistic because it’s not a really true measure of his speed. Would anyone really want Santana to try to steal a base when the game is on the line? Maybe if you have a two or three run lead in the fourth inning, but in a critical situation, he’s staying put. That’s why his steal total is inconsequential.
Santana scored 72 runs in 2015 and 68 in 2014. In 2015, he had 19 home runs and in 2014 he had 27 home runs. That means Santana scored just 53 times when he didn’t hit a home run in 2015 and only 41 times in 2014 when he didn’t hit a home run. He also hit 29 doubles in 2015 and 25 doubles in 2014, yet he’s not crossing the plate very often and that’s not to be overlooked when someone walks more than 100 times per year.
He ranked fifth in MLB in 2015 in walks trailing only Joey Votto (143), Bryce Harper (124), Paul Goldschmidt (118) and Jose Bautista (110). When comparing the top 25 hitters in walks, Santana ranks 22nd out of these top 25 in walks with 72 runs scored ahead of only Joc Pederson who 7th in walks drawing 92 walks and scoring 67 runs, Miguel Cabrera who was tied for 15th in walks drawing 77 and scoring 64 runs, and Joe Mauer who was 25th in walks drawing 67 walks and scoring 69 runs.
A BaseballReference.com statistic called Runs Better Than Average measures the number of runs a player is better than a league average player. Santana was a -12 in Runs Better Than Average in 2015, and in 2014, he was a +4 in this category and in 2013, Santana was +16. Not a good trend.
Santana isn’t especially great at scoring from second base when a batter hits a single. For his career, Santana has scored 52 times out of 98 times or 53 percent of the times when he was on second base and the hitter got a single. To compare, Jason Kipnis scored 70 percent of the times when he was on second base and the batter hit a single in 2015. This is important because Kipnis hit 43 doubles in 2015, whereas Santana hit 29 doubles and the odds of Kipnis getting one hit from double and then scoring on a single are much greater than Santana.
What I’m trying to point out is Kipnis has a much greater ability to use his speed and power to score a run without the benefit of two hits or a sacrifice bunt or a “productive out” via a ground ball or deep fly ball.
It’s possible that Santana, and all the glory of his walks, might need a combined two or even three hits/walks from his teammates to come around to score when he gets a base on balls.
Picture a scenario where Santana gets a lead-off walk while facing the Tigers in Detroit. Francisco Lindor gets a single and runners are on first and second as Santana fails to get to third. Kipnis batting third gets a single and Santana fails to score from second and Lindor is prevented from using his speed to go from first to third and instead remains on second base. Bases are loaded with no outs. Cleanup hitter Mike Napoli hits a medium fly ball to left field. Santana can’t score on a sacrifice fly opportunity and no runners advance with one out. The number five hitter comes up and hits into a double play and no runs have scored and the inning is over.
Let’s try this with Kipnis as the lead-off batter. He gets a walk and then Lindor gets a single and Kipnis moves to third. The number three hitter (whoever that might be with Michael Brantley out) gets a single and Kipnis scores and Lindor also moves over to third. Napoli hits a medium fly ball to left field and Lindor scores on the sacrifice fly. Score is 2-0. The number five batter (perhaps Santana) comes to bat and with no one on base so there is no double play in order and just one out. The starting pitcher has to work harder that inning and is behind in the game and the potential remains for more runs. Even if the next two hitters go down in order, the score is still Indians 2-0.
I understand this scenario isn’t necessarily going to happen and certainly could turn out differently. There are parts individually that could occur more often such as failing to score on a sacrifice fly or going first to third etc, but the idea here is to illustrate that the speed of Kipnis and Lindor could be impaired with a guy like Santana clogging up the bases in front of them. It also means the potential to scratch out runs at the beginning of the game drops a bit. When a team that has a lot of offensive shortcomings doesn’t use some of the assets it has such as the speed at the top of the order with Kipnis, Lindor and eventually Brantley, then it makes it that much harder to score.
It’s important to note that Kipnis played well as the team’s lead-off hitter in 2015. He led off the game 121 times and hit .302/.331/.526 and came around to score 35 times in the first inning or just under 30 percent of the time (28.9 percent) for each plate appearance. When he was the lead-off hitter, Kipnis hit .311/.385/.476 for the season in 562 plate appearances. When he batted elsewhere in the lineup, Kipnis hit just 18-for-73 (.247) in 79 plate appearances.
Kipnis seemed to flourish in his role as the team’s leadoff hitter, plus quite simply, he has a higher on-base percentage overall than Santana (.372 to .357). Why mess with that success?
An argument can be made that maybe the Indians can just use Santana at lead-off while Brantley is out and slide Kipnis down to the number three slot in the lineup. I’d rather see someone like Lindor or even Rajai Davis or perhaps Jose Ramirez bat lead-off before Santana if you want to move Kipnis down to the third spot while Brantley is out, even though I’d rather he stay put in the lead-off position. That, however, is an argument for another time.
Simply put, there’s a reason that speedier guys like Kipnis have traditionally led off baseball games and that’s because it is easier to get them across the plate.

Read More